Space Imaging’s Ikonos satellite captured this 1-m-resolution color image of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport in Arlington, Va. Courtesy spaceimaging.com.

What, and how much
Ultimately, military satellites are no more and no less than very useful tools that help government provide security to its citizens. It is important to understand this in order to avoid an overreliance on this technology and a belief that more of it is necessarily always better. It is possible that we may need more satellites than are now planned, or different types. But this realization should not be based solely on the new threat that we face.

It is not clear, for example, that we need more surveillance and reconnaissance satellites. What may be required is that we find better ways to apply and analyze the information that is collected. Certainly, there has been talk about DOD sharing more of its satellite data with civil intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Besides, it is becoming evident that commercial Earth imaging satellite systems such as Ikonos are capable of complementing military spy satellites. Note the recent National Imagery and Mapping Agency contract to Space Imaging for exclusive rights to all Ikonos imagery of conflict areas in Central Asia. The $1.9-million deal can be renewed on a monthly basis.

The Ikonos satellite, launched on September 24, 1999, provides 1-m resolution. Equally capable is DigitalGlobe’s QuickBird, sent into orbit on October 18, 2001. India’s Technology Experiment Satellite, launched on October 22, 2001, provides 1-m resolution. And Israel’s Image-Sat International has a 1.8-m capability with its Eros satellite.

Thus there does not appear to be any great urgency for a stepped-up spy satellite-building program. The launching of three spacecraft for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) during September and October is purely a coincidence, rather than a response to September 11.

Staying in touch
On the other hand, given the presence of U.S. air and ground forces in Afghanistan, one can make a stronger case for ensuring optimal secure satellite communications. It is important to make certain that soldiers and their commanders never lose contact with each other, and that those communications cannot be picked up by the enemy. That is why there should be a renewed sense of urgency for deploying the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system, the follow-on to MILSTAR, on time.

The Air Force wants to launch the first AEHF satellite by 2004 to avoid a gap in coverage caused by the loss of the MILSTAR II-F3 satellite on April 30, 1999. At the moment, it looks as if the first AEHF will not go up until 2006—two years behind schedule.

A team consisting of Lockheed Martin Space Systems and TRW Space & Electronics is designing the $3-billion, four-satellite AEHF system, which is expected to be fully deployed by 2010. It is not clear how the Air Force would address the coverage gap during 2004-2006.

The point is that with its forces actively engaged in combat, the U.S. government no longer has the luxury of trying to stretch the capabilities of some of its space assets. A deficiency in secure satellite communications could have been downplayed in times of peace, but during a conflict it becomes highlighted.

	The MILSTAR II system suffered a gap in coverage when its F-3 satellite was placed into a useless orbit in April 1999 following a launch vehicle failure.

Reevaluating some systems…
Interestingly, what we are noticing is not a rush by DOD to seek a substantial increase in funds for AEHF and other military satellite systems, but rather attempts to reevaluate some of these systems and see how they can be reconfigured to save money.

Instead of redoubling efforts to build and launch some sort of secure communications payload to bridge the gap between MILSTAR and AEHF, the Air Force appears to be focusing on a concept for integrating AEHF with its proposed Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS) and NRO communications relay satellites. The goal is to find a way to get by with only two AEHF satellites.

The Air Force has also proposed to reduce the scope of a planned 10-satellite surveillance and targeting radar system that it had hoped to deploy by 2008. Again, as part of an effort to divert funds for more near-term war-fighting requirements such as aerial surveillance vehicles, the service is looking to a space program to save money. The system, formerly known as Discoverer II, had already been significantly downsized from the original 24-satellite constellation.

Meanwhile, the Navy has proposed scaling back its proposed $8-billion Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) to save money in the near term. MUOS, which is to be the Navy’s UHF follow-on system, was to have been operational in 2010, but the service is now talking about full deployment by 2018.

The sense we are getting is that the U.S. military is perfectly willing to slow down development of some of its space-based assets during the next few years unless Congress authorizes generous increases in funding.

Another military satellite system that is not fully defined is the WGS, intended to augment and eventually replace the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS). We expect that there will be at least three WGS satellites built by Boeing Satellite Systems and launched, all before 2008. Additional Gapfillers will depend on the results of the Pentagon’s evaluation of commercial broadband systems such as Hughes’ Spaceway.

In February 2001, Hughes Network Systems confirmed that Spaceway, whose launches are set to begin this year, would be evaluated by the Air Force during the system’s upcoming beta testing program.

If the Air Force believes such systems can adequately meet its requirements, then we believe there is a good chance the service will move to lease a significant amount of its communications capacity from the commercial sector. We think the Air Force would seek to lease capacity on various commercial broadband systems, including Spaceway and Lockheed Martin’s Astrolink.

	The Wideband Gapfiller System is intended to be no more than an interim solution to DOD's projected shortfall in wideband communications capacity.

If this is the case, then there would not be a need for procuring the additional three Gapfillers that have been proposed. The issue then would be whether or not to proceed with development of an “Advanced Wideband System.” This is, in fact, the advanced system that is considered to be the ultimate goal of the Air Force with respect to DSCS follow-on. Wideband Gapfiller, as its name suggests, is really meant to be no more than an interim solution to DOD’s projected shortfall in wideband communications capacity during the second half of the decade.

One has to assume, however, that if the option of commercial leasing is exercised and ends up working well for the military, there would be some pressure—from a costs standpoint—to seriously rethink a dedicated Advanced Wideband System.

	The Air Force is unlikely to delay planned upgrades to the NAVSTAR GPS system.

…and proceeding with others
Boeing, which is now set to replace Lockheed Martin as the preeminent manufacturer of spy satellites, is also developing the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) system for the NRO. We do not anticipate any reorientation of this program, although this is hard to predict since information about it is sketchy. It is not clear yet just how many spacecraft will make up the FIA constellation, but we understand that a 12-satellite system is being considered.

The last of the Lockheed Martin Lacrosse spy satellites for NRO is scheduled to be launched in 2002-2003. The first FIAs are planned for 2003, with a full constellation expected to be operational by 2005. With an estimated design lifetime of six to eight years each, FIAs launched during 2003-2005 would need to be replaced by around 2009-2010.

Neither would we expect major delays in the development of the Air Force’s improved next-generation GPS III, the follow-on to the NAVSTAR GPS Block 2R models now being launched. Given the better-than-expected performance of current and past NAVSTAR GPS spacecraft, this is one military satellite program that would seem not to be in any great hurry for a follow-on. The 24-satellite constellation is operating at full capacity and has plenty of available ground spares.

The fact is that the technology is available to upgrade the accuracy and power of the NAVSTAR GPS, so the Air Force is indeed interested in applying this technology as soon as possible—regardless of the system’s good health.

Lockheed Martin is working on upgrading 12 Block 2Rs, and Boeing is building 12 new ones, which should be deployed during the next few years. In addition, the companies have been involved in separate architecture studies for the GPS III. The Air Force plans to release a request for proposals for GPS III soon and to issue two preacquisition contracts for the system by March. A prime contractor for its development would be selected in 2004-2005, with the initial satellites scheduled for launch by about 2010.

	The DMSP system will be replaced by N-POESS, which is still in development.

The National Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (N-POESS), a joint effort with NASA and NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), is the follow-on to the Air Force Defense Meteorological Satellites Program (see Aerospace America, November 2001, page 33). The design of the system’s architecture is continuing, and the Air Force and NASA are still expected to downselect between Lockheed Martin and TRW and award a prime contract this year.

At the moment, though, it is unclear whether this will be a three-satellite constellation or something else. A three-satellite N-POESS is based on the assumption that some of the instruments for the system would also be flown on select European meteorological satellites such as Metop-3. But it now appears that the European satellites may not be large enough to accommodate the devices.

Hence the Air Force and NASA have had to reassess platform needs. It is possible that additional N-POESS satellites may have to be launched, which could significantly increase program costs. Even if this were the case, though, we believe Congress would be supportive in light of the sizable cost savings N-POESS represents.

Because N-POESS is a joint program of NASA and NOAA, it eliminates the current duplication between civil and military meteorological satellites and will save nearly $2 billion during its lifetime. It would not make sense for Congress to drag its feet on this program. Any way you look at it, the program is a bargain and one of the best examples of good management and prudent thinking on the part of the U.S. government.

SBIRS remains a question
Probably one of the more difficult U.S. military satellite programs to gauge is the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS), mainly because it is not clear how the Bush administration will proceed with the development and deployment of a ballistic missile defense system. There has been no concrete indication that the administration is backing away from BMD and supporting early-warning satellite systems such as SBIRS, due for initial deployment by mid-decade. But you have to at least wonder about the schedule of these programs, given the new spirit of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia following September 11.

Talks between the administration and Russian leaders regarding ways to work together on the war against terrorism are increasingly focused on reaching some sort of compromise with regard to the U.S. BMD program. Depending on the outcome of these negotiations, SBIRS may ultimately look different from the 30-satellite system now envisioned.