P-3s have dominated the maritime patrol aircraft for decades.

The almighty Orion
There are few disagreements that the P-3 Orion is the best MPA ever built. A land-based Lockheed design powered by four turboprop engines, the first production aircraft (a P-3A) flew in April 1961. A total of 649 have been built, and the production line is now dormant. License production by Kawasaki in Japan has also ended after the manufacture of 107 P-3s.

The Navy has been incrementally upgrading its Orion fleet, with the basic P-3C model being improved and retrofitted to Updates I, II, and III. The latest P-3 upgrade, known as the anti-surface warfare improvement program or AIP, is designed to improve the aircraft’s communications, surveillance, and targeting capabilities. It includes the Raytheon APS-137 radar, designed for the canceled Update IV package, and other improvements.

During the Cold War, the Navy acknowledged that the Orion was indeed the optimal MPA design. In fact, the LRAACA (Long-Range Air ASW Capable Aircraft) replacement program resulted in Lockheed’s P-7, which was effectively a rejuvenated P-3. Unfortunately, serious technical problems and the end of the Cold War resulted in a Navy decision to cancel the P-7 in July 1990.

Some 15 foreign users have acquired P-3s, and many have embarked upon extensive upgrades. Norway has gone with a solution based on Lockheed Martin’s own AIP, while Australia has initiated a Raytheon upgrade (in January Raytheon sold this business unit to L-3). Meanwhile, Spain has launched a P-3 upgrade program using the EADS Fully Integrated Tactical System, or FITS. This system is also being adapted to smaller airframes, including the EADS/CASA C-295 and C-212.

Many foreign P-3 customers have acquired new P-3s. The last new-build customer was South Korea, which acquired eight planes in 1995. Others, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, have acquired used aircraft.

In short, the high-end MPA market has been coasting on a 40-year-old classic that, aside from the eight South Korean planes, has not been in production for over a decade. This coasting, however, might be coming to an end. High-quality P-3 airframes are increasingly difficult to find. The Navy needs its fleet. Additional planes are going to the U.S. Customs Service, which uses them for counterdrug missions.

The first potential foreign customer to be affected by the P-3 shortage is Taiwan, which wants 12 aircraft but is unwilling to pay the high costs associated with a production line restart. The only other short-term customer is South Korea, which is contemplating another eight-plane acquisition. U.S. military officials have indicated that Taiwan may have to accept a different, less capable MPA platform. In the midst of this difficult market situation, a new competitor has emerged: BAE Systems’ upgraded Nimrods, launched by a mid-1996 U.K. RAF order. This order killed the U.K. market for Lockheed Martin and the P-3, creating the Nimrod 2000.

	Nimrod

MMA and other new markets
Despite the failure of previous P-3 replacement programs, it looks as if the time might be right to try again. In late 2001 the Navy completed its Analysis of Alternatives for a new Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) program. The service has decided to go with manned off-the-shelf platforms using new sensors and weapons. Options include the BAE Nimrod, MPA adaptations of civil jetliners, and new or rebuilt P-3s. A request for proposals was issued in February. A winner could be selected in 2004, and the new plane should enter service in 2010 or 2012.

Yet the scope of the MMA acquisition plan raises doubts. The Navy says it requires only 130-150 search and attack MMA versions and 16-20 surveillance/intelligence aircraft (corresponding to the current EP-3 spy planes). This relatively unambitious procurement will create high unit costs, which might be deemed unaffordable. This could limit MMA to a simple P-3 upgrade/rebuild effort to keep costs low.

To make a more ambitious MMA solution viable, the Navy could seek export markets. But there are problems with this approach. The other two large MPA markets are Britain, which has its Nimrods, and Japan, which has initiated a costly indigenous solution, the P-X. In December 2001, Japan’s Defense Agency selected former P-3 prime Kawasaki to lead this effort. The Japanese military wants to buy 80 P-Xs, plus 40 C-X transport planes, whose design will have considerable commonality with the P-X.

A purely Japanese solution has no guarantees of securing adequate funding. But as long as the P-X effort is alive, the U.S. can only propose a cooperative program to ensure P-X/MMA commonality, probably with a common mission system. And the MMA will continue as a purely U.S. program.

Beyond Britain and Japan, there are three smaller MPA markets that could provide additional hope for the MMA effort. Australia, a current P-3 user, has launched its Air 7000 MPA program. This will be coordinated with another program to acquire Northrop Grumman Global Hawk UAVs. These could be used to extend the reach of Australia’s 17 P-3Cs, which could once again be upgraded and rebuilt.

	France recently acquired 28 Atlantique 2s.

The other two high-end MPA markets are Germany and Italy, which are hoping to select new MPA fleets late this year. Germany wants 10-12 planes, while Italy wants 14. Yet unlike the other high-end MPA markets, Germany and Italy currently use Dassault’s Atlantique. This classic system is eminently upgradable—France has acquired 28 Atlantique 2s to follow on from their original Atlantique fleet. Dassault has proposed an Atlantique 3, which could either be new build or rebuilt from current versions. This solution would feature modern engines and sensors, and would offer relatively low up-front costs.

Yet Germany finds it increasingly difficult to fund defense programs of any size, and faces almost no maritime threat. Italy might go its own way and opt for a mix of used planes. The country is also greatly enhancing its maritime helicopter fleet, acquiring both NH-90s and EH 101s for the MPA/ASW role.

In short, the U.S. is effectively in the driver’s seat in determining the next high-end MPA system. The U.K. has gone its own way, and Japan wants an indigenous solution as well. All the other countries are constrained by either shrinking budgets or short-term time horizons.

	Predators have been used in conjunction with P-3s in the conflict in Afghanistan.

Problems with the solutions
As a partial solution to the Navy’s MPA needs, UAVs sound good—they are relatively low cost, and there are few doubts that UAVs will play a growing role in maritime reconnaissance and target acquisition. But they are not a panacea. Although they can extend the reach of any MPA “system of systems,” it is difficult to imagine more than a few MPA roles being performed without a human in the loop. Aside from the challenge of remotely controlling a UAV at great range, situational awareness is a crucial part of the mission. Unsurprisingly, the Navy’s MMA Analysis of Alternatives clearly ruled out a UAV-based approach, although it did state that UAVs should be part of a long-term MMA architecture.

Similarly, some military officials increasingly regard jetliners as the solution to the problem. After all, the reasoning goes, jetliners such as Boeing’s 737 are low-cost platforms, already in production, with few development costs. There is plenty of room for workstations and consoles inside, and the fuselages are large enough to carry munitions and sonobuoys. There would be logistics commonality with numerous planes operating today. Since the P-3 was itself adapted from a contemporary off-the-shelf passenger transport (Lockheed’s own Electra), why not do it again?

But there are myriad problems with this solution. For one, a jetliner is optimized for high-speed, high-altitude cruise. Its swept wings and turbofan engines would offer mediocre performance for frequent swoops and dives, which are necessary for the MPA mission. To hunt targets, MPA planes frequently need to get close to the water. Turbofan fuel consumption at low altitude is much greater than for turboprops, which would reduce endurance considerably. Also, taking a pressurized jetliner hull and carving out bays for weapons and sonobuoys would create significant nonrecurring costs. These development costs could erode, and possibly eliminate, the economic advantage of going with an off-the-shelf jetliner solution. And the alternative to adding these weapons bays—using jetliners solely as spotter planes, with radars and sensors but no weapons, is equally undesirable. It requires close coordination between the jetliner “spotter,” and a “shooter” plane, presumably a Boeing F/A-18E/F that would also need to be adapted for the mission. This cumbersome approach is unlikely to have much appeal.

These problems with the jetliner solution have been seen before—several jets were proposed for the Navy’s LRAACA contest, before the Navy went with the turboprop P-7. Yet there are supporters in the Navy who would prefer to use jetliners. In addition to the costs argument, the pro-jetliner faction points to the superior speed and high-altitude performance of turbofans, which could maximize sweep range and deployment time. Besides the P-3, Lockheed Martin has discussed a joint bid with EADS using Airbus A319/320 narrowbody jetliners. This bid might not materialize, but the discussions show that the P-3’s chief advocate may be hedging its bets.

Meanwhile, there is Nimrod. Its turbofans give it greater speed than a turboprop aircraft, but its relatively straight wings make it more maneuverable than a modern civil jetliner. It already has a large bay for weapons and sonobuoys. Most of the nonrecurring costs have been paid for by the British government. The heart of Nimrod is a U.S. Tactical Command System (TCS) from Boeing. While it can be regarded as a dark horse competitor, the Navy has requested information on this new/old solution. It is even possible that new Nimrod airframes would be built, resurrecting a civil jetliner design (the Comet) that first flew in 1949.

There is also a strong political dimension to the Nimrod bid. The special relationship between the U.S. and Britain has been revitalized. Britain has joined the development phase of the U.S. Joint Strike Fighter, ultimately contributing billions of dollars to this high-profile program. Britain is also a conspicuous ally in the current antiterror conflict. A U.S. Nimrod acquisition would imply a strong U.S. commitment to a two-way street. Meanwhile, Boeing’s TCS could be adaptable to Japan’s P-X program. This would solve the problem of U.S./Japanese interoperability and give Japan a short-cut to its own indigenous MPA.

In all, the MPA market has spent the past 12 years in a dormant state, coasting on the mighty P-3 and other existing assets. But the P-3 fleet is in demand everywhere, and the aircraft cannot stay in service forever. A renewed awareness of the versatility of a good MPA platform should result in a born-again market. This market will be transformed by a solution provided by the MMA program.