Tony Blair

	Jacques Chirac

	Four USAF F-16s line up at the end of the runway at Aviano Air Base, Italy, before taking off on NATO Operation Allied Force missions. About 80% of all combat missions there were flown by U.S. pilots. Photo by Tech. Sgt. Steven Taylor, USAF.

Defense shortfalls remain
In the Kosovo conflict, Europe could muster only a relatively small military capability—around 80% of all combat missions there were flown by U.S. pilots, and the U.S. provided the main logistics, intelligence, and communications support. Since then, EU countries have been determined to build a much more robust force to give them greater influence in areas of political turmoil surrounding the continent’s borders, but without dramatically increasing defense spending.

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, U.S. military spending on equipment in 1999 was $63.5 billion (at 1995-dollar prices), compared with just $25.01 billion by the 15 European NATO countries combined, not including France. Put another way, the U.S. spends about 3.2% of its gross domestic product on defense, while EU countries average only 2.1%. New policies to increase defense spending seem to hold little appeal in Europe.

In particular, EU forces have appeared extremely deficient in air- and sea-lift capabilities, satellite intelligence, precision-guided munitions, and all-weather/night-strike aircraft. Although there are some renewed efforts by Europe to catch up—including the Helios military satellite program, the Airbus A400M military transport, and substantial European interest in the Joint Strike Fighter—it will be many years before European forces become self-sufficient in these technologies.

So unless and until European industry can suddenly provide the equipment to match the U.S., European forces will continue to rely on U.S. support in major multinational operations. In the short term at least, the supremacy of NATO within Europe looks assured, especially given the commitments to the organization from EU states at the Nice summit.

In the longer term, however, two threats to the current position may emerge: the security implications inherent in the EU’s push for a common foreign policy, and the potential division of the EU into a multispeed institution, with "fast-track" nations creating their own EU bodies.

Toward a common foreign policy
The EU is changing fast, and nowhere more quickly than in the field of foreign affairs. One of the main outcomes of the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force on May 1, 1999, was the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

According to the European Commission: "The Union’s security and defense objectives have been reformulated in the Amsterdam Treaty. The so-called Petersberg tasks (humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking) are explicitly mentioned in the treaty as aspects of the Union’s security policy. The development of CFSP into a common defense, along with the possibility of integrating [the] Western European Union into the Union, is indicated."

EU defense interests are, for the foreseeable future, a matter for individual states, even within the RRF. But inevitably, the development of an ever-active EU foreign and security policy will increasingly involve EU institutions.

"The military dimension is not a matter for the commission," said Chris Patten, external relations commissioner, speaking last October. "But another thing we have learned in the Balkans is that you cannot simply divorce the military from the nonmilitary side of crisis management. You have to have close coordination between institutions if you are to deliver an effective European foreign policy on the ground; you have to coordinate your assets in the service of a single strategy.

"The commission might, for example, be providing customs support and training in one or more countries, or police training, or media support, or implementing trade concessions, or helping to nurture institutions, upon the success of which depend the prospects for withdrawing expensive peacekeeping troops and building a lasting peace."

Expansion into new areas
The CFSP is developing rapidly into new arenas—from external trade and international development (EU states account for 55% of all official international development assistance) into more wide-ranging areas.

"We have to establish a strategic partnership with Russia," said Patten, "helping the federation to develop the infrastructure of sound economic management, assisting with improvements in the safety of nuclear power, working to deal with some of the shared problems around the Baltic. We have burgeoning, complex trade and political relations with China and India. We are supporting political initiatives to bring greater security to the Korean peninsula. We have concluded a Free Trade and Political Agreement with Mexico and seek similar agreements elsewhere in Latin America. We are funding peace efforts right across Africa. We devote much attention to our developed-country partners in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], like the USA, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand."

Whether NATO will always be the best home for a military capability to support this burgeoning EU foreign policy is not completely clear.

Becoming a multispeed entity
The second threat comes from the development of a multispeed European Union. A two-speed integration system already applies, separating those EU countries that have adopted the euro from those that have not. With new members from Eastern Europe about to join, it now looks likely that a three-speed EU might emerge, led by a core of countries keen on pushing ahead in integrating their financial, industrial, economic, and, perhaps, military institutions.

This is already apparent in Europe’s aerospace industry, where consolidation has failed to take place across the continent. In the race to catch up with the U.S. in key aerospace areas, the fault lines between the EADS consortium and BAE Systems are already starting to appear. For example, BAE Systems has been reluctant to share some elements of stealth technology with its European partners.

Although France and Germany appeared to disagree at the start of the Nice summit about NATO’s role in the RRF, they are heading the fast-track, integrationist movement. French and German companies are also pioneering European solutions to the current technology shortfall in military aerospace capabilities. But the catch-up timescale for European companies seeking parity with the U.S. on some key technologies, such as stealthy uninhabited air vehicles, has been estimated at around 20 years. In the meantime, Europe will have to do without, or choose U.S. systems.

Changes in the wind
With the establishment of the RRF, a Rubicon has been crossed—the EU will have a military wing, albeit one that will exist under the aegis of NATO. It is not yet clear whether, as the EU becomes wider, it can at the same time become deeper.

But there was another, less publicized result of the December summit in Nice: a further shift away from the requirement that European Union legislation be passed unanimously by all states before becoming national law.

Qualified majority voting now covers approximately 90% of all EU law, making it impossible for one country to veto proposed European legislation. Although defense is still a matter for individual nations, certain areas of foreign policy—such as external border controls and foreign trade in services—now are subject to qualified majority voting The speed with which the EU is changing, it seems, means that almost nothing is off the agenda.

The European RRF: Shape and scale
The final decision to set up a European RRF (first proposed at the Helsinki summit in December 1999) was taken in November 2000, when EU defense ministers agreed to set up a 60,000-strong force by 2003. The plan is to begin peacekeeping missions in areas up to 4,000 km from Europe. Given that there will need to be strategic reserves, the real manpower figure could rise to 100,000—supported by 400 combat aircraft and 100 warships.

Germany will have the largest troop contingent—13,500 soldiers—followed by the U.K. (12,500), France (12,000), Italy and Spain (6,000 each), and the Netherlands (5,000). Out of the 15 EU nations, only Denmark has declined to allocate troops to the force.

The RRF’s missions will focus on peacekeeping operations. These can range from humanitarian efforts to physically separating warring parties during conflict—something in which NATO does not want to become involved. NATO would have "first refusal" in carrying out any military mission.

This has left the RRF and NATO with a complex bureaucratic arrangement. The RRF will have fewer than 100 staff based at EU headquarters in Brussels, but without any planning, logistics, or operational capability.

NATO’s response
NATO’s response to the establishment of the RRF has been relatively upbeat. "The EU and NATO will go forward together," NATO spokesman Mark Laity told Aerospace America. "NATO supports a European Rapid Reaction Force, provided it is compatible with NATO.

"The most important aspect of the [Nice] summit was that Europe will enhance its capabilities, in the context of doing more, spending more, and refining more—and that will mean more equipment, especially in the areas of strategic airlift and precision guided weapons equipment."

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that, for the moment at least, these are uncertain times for the organization, especially with a new U.S. president taking office.