How can you design your Gunship to be more survivable?


Introduction

Recent events in the Middle East and elsewhere point to a need for a new Gunship aircraft to respond to rapidly changing situations. According to the RFP, the number one general design requirement is to achieve high survivability versus low cost threats, such as Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).

The design mission of the Gunship consists of takeoff from home base, climb to best cruise altitude, cruise at best cruise speed to the target area at least 500 nautical miles from takeoff, loiter at 20,000 feet for a minimum of four hours with a sustained manuever of 1.5g's, descend to 10,000 feet for target identification and to expend payload, climb to cruise altitude, cruise back to home base, loiter, and land.

The Gunship will be at risk of being shot down by enemy/terrorist (threat) weapons while on any of the mission segments. Of interest in this design competition is the segment where the Gunship descends to 10,000 feet and attempts to identify the target and deliver its ordnance. The primary threat weapons at this altitude are the AAA and the MANPADS.

Your Gunship will have a better chance of surviving a mission into a man-made hostile area when it is designed and operated to avoid being hit by any of the threat weapons in that area (referred to as low susceptibility - don't get hit) and to withstand any hits that do occur (referred to as low vulnerability - don't go down if hit). (Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.1, What is Aircraft Combat Survivability?)

Low susceptibility is achieved by using the six susceptibility reduction (SR) concepts listed below (Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.8, How is Survivability Enhanced? and Sec. 4.4, Task III: Design for Low Susceptibility Using Susceptibility Reduction Technology)

  • Threat warning (look out for the threat weapons),
  • Noise jamming and deceiving (e.g. electronic countermeasures equipment),
  • Signature reduction (e.g. stealth),
  • Expendables (e.g. chaff and flares),
  • Threat suppression (eliminate/degrade the enemy's air defense), and
  • Weapons and tactics, flight performance, and crew training and proficiency

Low vulnerability is achieved by using the six vulnerability reduction (VR) concepts listed below (Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.8, How is Survivability Enhanced? and Sec. 5.4, Task III: Design for Low Vulnerability Using Vulnerability Reduction Technology)

  • Component redundancy (with separation) (e.g. two widely spaced engines),
  • Component location (e.g. no fuel near ignition sources),
  • Passive damage suppression (e.g. nitrogen enriched air in fuel tank ullages),
  • Active damage suppression (e.g. fire detection and extinguishing system),
  • Component shielding (e.g. armored pilot seat), and
  • Component elimination or replacement (e.g. electrically powered actuators)

In this design competition, both vulnerability reduction and susceptibility will be considered.

Note: The design exercise described here has been simplified for use by the student, and should not be considered as representative of any particular aircraft, weapon, or scenario. The numerical examples and functional relationships given are more complex in reality and often classified. Furthermore, there are many more design options to consider when designing an aircraft to be survivable in combat. The intent of the exercise is to provide the student with an opportunity to learn about the survivability discipline and how it affects the design and operation of aircraft. It is not to provide information and details from which the student may possibly draw erroneous conclusions regarding the impact of any particular feature on the survivability of actual aircraft.



The design trade study

There are many different ways to enhance an aircraft's survivability, as illustrated in Table P.2 in the Preface of Ref. 1 and on the page What is this discipline called survivability?. A trade study is conducted to determine the benefits (e.g. fewer aircraft shot down and people killed over the life of the aircraft) and impacts (e.g. increase in dollar cost due to purchase, installation, maintenance, and operations) associated with any particular survivability enhancement feature or combination of features. The trade study process is illustrated below:

Ref. 1, Fig. 1.10

The mission-threat analysis (Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.12.1 Mission-threat analysis) identifies the weapons that are the primary threat to the Gunship on each mission. For the Gunship on the design mission described above, the threats in the target area that are estimated to have a maximum altitude of at least 10,000 feet are (Ref. 1, Sec. 3.4.1, Types of Threats):

  • a light or medium caliber AAA (a gun), and
  • a MANPADS (an infrared (IR) guided missile).

Both the gun projectile and the MANPADS missile are assumed to have a high-explosive (HE) warhead with a contact fuze -- the projectile or missile must hit the aircraft in order to damage and possibly kill it. (Ref.1, Sec. 3.4.2, Types of Warheads and Their Damage Mechanisms)

The aircraft description (Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.12.2 Aircraft description) is your Gunship design.

The susceptibility assessment (Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.12.3 Susceptibility assessment) determines the probability the aircraft is hit by the projectile or missile, PH, when it is engaged by the gun or the missile system.

The vulnerability assessment (Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.12.4, Vulnerability assessment) determines the probability the aircraft is killed when hit, PK|H, by either the gun projectile or the guided missile.

The survivability assessment (Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.2, How Do We Measure Survivability? and Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.12.5, Survivability assessment) determines the probability the aircraft is killed in an encounter with either the AAA or the MANPADS (a one-on-one scenario), PK (denoted as PK|E in the RFP), where

     PK = PK = PH•PK|H           (Ref. 1, Eq. 1.2)

The trade study (Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.12.6 Trade Studies and Ref. 1, Sec. 6.3, Survivability Enhancement Trade Studies) determines the benefits and impacts associated with each survivability feature considered. The benefits include the number of aircraft and lives saved by the feature over the lifetime of the aircraft (usually converted to a $ figure), and the impacts include the additional weight, acquisition and operations dollar costs, degraded flight performance, schedule delay, etc. When a specific numerical requirement is imposed on the maximum value of PK for a particular threat weapon, the trade study determines the optimum combination of survivability enhancement features that satisfy that requirement.

Once the design is finalized, test articles are built and tested to determine the ability of the design to achieve the levels of survivability stipulated in the design requirements.



The Gunship survivability design requirement

In the case of the AAA threat, the PK (the PK|E in the RFP) without any survivability enhancements is assumed to be 0.18. This can be reduced to the PK < 0.10 design requirement by use of up to four of the vulnerability reduction features listed below (Ref.1, Sec. 5.4, Task III: Design for Low Vulnerability Using Vulnerability Reduction Technology):

  • Fuel tank ullage protection (prevents a fuel tank explosion or catastrophic fire and subsequent loss of structural integrity)
  • Dry bay fire detection and suppression (prevents the loss of surrounding structure and other critical components that are located within the bay, e.g., flight control, electrical, and hydraulic components)
  • Engine bay fire detection and suppression (prevents loss of an engine)
  • Redundancy (with separation) of flight critical controls (prevents loss of control of the aircraft)

Each of these VR features is designed to prevent the loss of one or more critical components on the aircraft (a critical component is a component that is essential for continuous safe flight).

In the case of the MANPADS threat, the overall PK without any survivability enhancements is assumed to be 0.45. This can be reduced to the PK < 0.10 requirement through use of up to four of the vulnerability reduction features listed above and one of two susceptibility reduction features listed below (Ref.1, Sec. 4.4, Task III: Design for Low Susceptibility Using Susceptibility Reduction Technology):

  • a flare dispenser (the flares draw the IR missile away from the aircraft)
  • a MANPADS IR Countermeasures (IRCM) system (a modulated electromagnetic signal confuses the missile tracking system)

Each of the above survivability enhancement features can achieve part of the overall PK < 0.10 design requirement for each threat. Your team must decide which measures to incorporate in the design to meet the design requirements for both the AAA and the MANPADS and to determine the total system cost and weight with the selected features included.



The Gunship survivability enhancement features

The data for each of the four vulnerability reduction features and the two susceptibility reduction features are given below.

Vulnerability Reduction Features for Both the AAA and the MANPADS Threats

Fuel tank ullage protection

What it is: An inert gas (usually nitrogen) is injected into the space above the fuel in the fuel tanks (the ullage). If the oxygen level in the tank ullage space is held below a certain level, hot missile fragments or incendiary bullets (API's) won't ignite the fuel vapor if these spaces are penetrated. There are several possible sources of the inert gas, such as gas bottles and an on-board inert gas generation system (OBIGGS). (Ref. 1, pp. 703-709)

Benefit: A potential 30% reduction in PK|H if added to all fuel tanks. If applied to a tank, it must be applied to the entire tank. If not applied to all tanks, the 30% reduction must be decreased by the fraction of tank top surface fuel area (at half full) that is unprotected compared to entire tankage top surface fuel area (at half full).

Example: An aircraft has three tanks, one fuselage and two wing tanks. The tank in the fuselage has a fuel surface area of 50 sq mtrs at half full. Each wing fuel tank has a fuel surface area of 100 sq mtrs at half full. If only the wings have ullage protection, the maximum reduction for the aircraft will be 24% instead of 30% (since there is only 200 sq mtrs protected out of a total of 250 sq mtrs).

Weight: For inert gas bottles, approximately 2 kg per 5000 kg of fuel.

Cost: For inert gas bottles, $400,000 (development) plus $2000 per kg (fabrication and installation) plus ??? for annual operations and maintenance costs.

Consider: Inert gas bottles are 0.1 m3 in size per 100 m3 in ullage volume (with half full fuel tanks). Bottles must be placed near ullage spaces. Estimate the maintenance and operation costs. Fuel tank ullage protection is also a system safety benefit in peace time. (The V-22 fuel system protection is described in http://198.65.138.161/military/systems/aircraft/v-22-fuel.htm)


Dry bay fire suppression (corrected 4/1/05)

What it is: A fire detection and suppression system that is placed in unmanned spaces or voids surrounding fuel tanks (or bays containing flammable liquids) to reduce the likelihood of a catastrophic fire resulting from the impact of an incendiary round or projectile spark. (Ref. 1, pp. 703-709)

Benefit: A potential 25% reduction in PK|H if applied to up to 50% of the dry bay volumes (assume no advantage for adding to more than 50% of the dry bays). Note that this means you must compute ALL dry bay volumes and add a suppression system to 50% of the volume spaces to achieve the full 25% reduction. If protection is applied to less than 50% of the total dry bay volume, the 25% reduction must be decreased by the fraction of dry bay volume that is protected.

Example: An aircraft has 120 cubic mtrs of dry bay volumes. thus, 60 mtrs must be protected to achieve the full 25% reduction. The design team decides to protect only the dry bay spaces under the belly of the fuselage fuel tank, which has a volume of 30 cubic mtrs. Consequently, the total reduction in PK|H would be only 25%•(30/60) = 12.5% (since only 30 of 60 cubic mtrs is actually protected).

Weight: 2 kg per 10 cubic mtrs of dry bay spaces (this figure includes the fire warning system).

Cost: $100,000 (development) plus $2000 per kg (fabrication and installation).

Consider: Think you can push the edge of your fuel tanks all the way to the edges of the wings or fuselage? Where are the lines and cables going to go? All of these spaces are dry bays, and they love to catch fire when the fuel tanks adjoining them are penetrated. So, don't forget the leading and trailing edges of the wings when computing dry bay volumes.


Engine bay fire detection and suppression

What it is: Fire detectors and extinguishers are mounted inside the engine cowlings around the core of the engine and are manually set off by the pilot when a “fire” warning light is indicated. (Ref. 1, pg. 711)

Benefit: A potential 20% reduction in PK|H if added to all engines. If not applied to all engines, the 20% reduction must be decreased by the fraction of engines with extinguishers.

Example: An aircraft has four engines, and two engines have fire extinguishers, so only a 10% reduction in PK|H is possible.

Weight: 20 kg per engine (includes the fire warning system).

Cost: $100,000 (development) plus $2000 per kg (fabrication and installation) plus ??? for annual operations and maintenance costs.

Consider: Fire extinguishers are also a system safety benefit in peace time.


Redundant and separated flight controls

What it is: Redundant flight controls are separated by at least 0.5 meters in any direction once they leave the crew cabin. If one is hit, the other system takes over automatically. (Ref. 1, pp. 712-716)

Benefit: A potential reduction in PK|H of 5%.

Weight: Doubles the weight over a single flight control - but who would have only one even without the threat of an HE projectile or missile hit?

Cost: $2000 per kg (fabrication and installation).

Consider: Typically, control redundancy is a matter of design planning, since most conventional planes have redundant flight control loops for safety of flight reasons. The difference here is the vulnerability requirement for adequate separation of the redundant components so that a single hit can not kill the components. [Another VR feature that is very important for the Gunship is the redundancy and separation of the power provided to the flight control actuators (traditionally hydraulic power but probably electrical in the future). (Ref. 1, pp. 713-716) Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient data available to include this option.]


Susceptibility Reduction Features for the MANPADS Threat

Flare dispenser or IR countermeasures system

What it is: Flare dispensers are boxes containing a number of IR flares and are placed at one or more locations around the aircraft. When an IR guided missile is thought to be approaching the aircraft, the dispenser ejects a flare that is intended to decoy the incoming missile away from the aircraft, causing the missile (hopefully) to miss the aircraft. (Ref. 1, pp. 582-583) The IR countermeasures system generates a modulated electromagnetic signal using a laser or xenon arc lamp and radiates that signal in the direction of an approaching missile to confuse the missile's IR tracking system. Both systems include a missile approach warning system (MAWS) that automatically detects an approaching missile. (Ref. 1, pp. 555-556) (For a description of the ALQ-157M IRCM used on the C-130 click here to download a PDF file.)

Benefit: A potential reduction in PH of 50% for the flare package and 70% for the IRCM.

Weight: 100 kg for either system. A single dispenser or IRCM is mounted aft of the rear landing gear on the bottom of fuselage, and each package has a volume of 0.25 cubic mtrs (dimensions = 1m x 1m x 0.25 m).

Cost: No development cost for either package, but include $500,000 for the flare dispenser (fabrication and installation) and $1.5 million for the IRCM (fabrication and installation).

Consider: The MAWS must have a clear view of the rear 180 degrees of the aircraft, with no obstructions from the aircraft that may obscure the view to a missile approaching from the rear or prevent flares or the laser/lamp from operating properly.



Your assignment

(1) Determine the VR and SR features that you want to add to the design of your Gunship to satisfy the survivability design requirement of PK < 0.1 for both the AAA and the MANPADS threats. Use the methodology described below to determine the value of PK for your selected design.

For the AAA threat and the baseline design with no VR features

     PK (baseline) = [PH (baseline)]•[PK|H (baseline)] = 0.18

For the more survivable aircraft with one or more SR or VR features

     PK (more survivable) = [PH (more survivable)]•[PK|H (more survivable)]

Dividing the second equation by the first equation and solving for the PK (more survivable) results in

     PK (more survivable) = 0.18•SR•VR

where

     SR = the relative change in susceptibility = [PH (more survivable)]/[PH (baseline)]

and

     VR = the relative change in vulnerability = [PK|H (more survivable)]/[PK|H (baseline)]

For example, suppose you select fuel tank inerting in all of the fuel tanks as one VR feature to use. Accordingly, the reduction in the PK|H is 30%, and hence VR = (1 - 0.3) = 0.7. Therefore, the new PK is

     PK (more survivable) = 0.18•[SR = 1]•[VR = 0.7] = 0.126          (fuel tank inerting)

This value is still above the design requirement of less than 0.10, so another VR feature must be added, such as dry bay fire protection in 50% of the dry bay volumes. The dry bay protection provides a PK|H reduction of 25%, and consequently the PK is further reduced to

     PK = 0.18•[SR = 1]•[VR = 0.7•0.75] = 0.095       (fuel tank inerting and dry bay protection)

Although this value of PK is less than the design requirement, this particular combination of VR features may not be the best combination when the associated weight and cost impacts are considered. Furthermore, the MANPADS threat must also be considered using this same methodology with a reduction in both susceptibility (SR) and vulnerability (VR). Thus, you must examine all possible combinations of the VR and SR features to determine the 'best' combination of features that satisfies the design requirement of PK < 0.1 for both threats and has the 'least' impact on the final weight and cost figures.

(If only it were this easy in 'real life'! In reality, we don't have the luxury of simple vulnerability reduction relationships like those given above that can be applied to our vulnerability measures. Instead, we use detailed models to simulate the effects of thousands of different shots at and hits on an aircraft. However, because our purpose here is to educate you on the potential value of these (and other) susceptibility and vulnerability reduction features, we hope you'll take the next step to learn more about survivability as described in Ref. 1.)

(2) Answer the question 'Which features, if any, would you add to your Gunship design if there was no survivability requirement?' and explain your answer. (Hint: System Safety and Combat Survivability have a common goal -- see Ref. 1, Sec. 1.1.15, Relationship between the Combat Survivability Discipline, .... , and the System Safety Discipline for Military and Civilian Aircraft)


If you have any questions, please send a message to Prof. Robert E. Ball at reball@redshift.com


 
Ref. 1, Ball, Robert E., "The Fundamentals of Aircraft Combat Survivability Analysis and Design," Second Edition, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Reston, VA, 2003